In recent years, explanations of primate cognition highlighted clever arguments, rather than different ability. In the target article, definitions unify, explanations rely on basic nervous system functioning, theory is built on data that fit, and the emphasis is on evolutionary continuities. This commentary describes complexities inherent in the development of empathy that are not accounted for in Preston & de Waal's theory.

An evolutionary model of crying requires consideration of nonhuman primate data. Chimpanzees do not have colic. Although they have a peak of fussiness at 6 weeks with a decline by 12 weeks whether raised by biological mothers or in a human nursery, their crying is always consolable. Colic may be a by-product of delayed rates of brain development; that is, neoteny.

Community Colleges, as contemporary educational institutions, are best understood by elucidating their legitimacy needs in a technological society. The nature of a technological society has been most clearly articulated in the work of Jacques Ellul. The growth of the technological society is inextricably tied to a vision of reality centered upon the empirical world and its manipulation by humans. This capacity to manipulate becomes so compelling that reality is virtually ex hausted of anything that cannot be objectively verified and subject (...) to manipulation. Within this framework, precise quantitative measures and manipulation be come the sole form of legitimacy. The community college is caught in this predicament and in compliance mutates into a pseudo-laboratory of interventions on its objects. The proposed trajectory of said institutions is one that is incapable of providing the fertile soil for the development of character or the discovery of meaning. (shrink)

"This is an excellent work that will lay just claim to being a major treatment of the most significant themes in the work of Leo Strauss. Sorensen's persuasive and original linking of Strauss's critical study of Machiavelli with Strauss on reason/revelation illuminates a new dimension of the philosopher's thought." —Walter Nicgorski, University of Notre Dame Leo Strauss has perhaps been more cited—and alternately vilified or revered—in the last ten years than during the productive years of his scholarly life. He has (...) been blamed for providing the intellectual underpinnings of a generation of neoconservatives in political philosophy and foreign policy. But though he may be cast as a conservative thinker who critiques modernity, to interpret him exclusively in this light is to reduce him in ways that his self-definition, as a political theorist open to both religion and philosophy, does not justify. Kim A. Sorensen clearly lays out the debate surrounding Strauss by reviewing his published work and legacy since his death in 1973. He then turns to a key distinction in Strauss's thought—between revelation and reason, or religion and philosophy—and maintains that Strauss used their mutual opposition to modernity as a central theme in his _oeuvre._ For Sorensen, Strauss considered revelation and reason both as fundamentally different worldviews and as alternate ways of understanding the good life. Sorensen explores Strauss's views on the revelation/reason distinction through a close examination of the final chapter in Strauss's _Thoughts on Machiavelli._ Here Strauss weighs Machiavelli's critique of religion in general and Christianity in particular, and Machiavelli's departure from the classical tradition of political philosophy dating from Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. For Strauss, the "crisis of our time" has its point of origin in Machiavelli's rejection of both biblical and classical morality as guides to the efficacy of political virtue. For Strauss, Sorensen claims, a recovery of the ancient virtues of classical political philosophy is essential. Sorensen also shows that while Strauss is accepting of reason, he is also open to revelation. In the end, he is a philosopher both of Athens and of Jerusalem. (shrink)

Knowledge of the context and development of playful expressions in chimpanzees is limited because research has tended to focus on social play, on older subjects, and on the communicative signaling function of expressions. Here we explore the rate of playful facial and body expressions in solitary and social play, changes from 12- to 15-months of age, and the extent to which social partners match expressions, which may illuminate a route through which context influences expression. Naturalistic observations of seven chimpanzee infants (...) ( Pan troglodytes ) were conducted at Chester Zoo, UK ( n = 4), and Primate Research Institute, Japan ( n = 3), and at two ages, 12 months and 15 months. No group or age differences were found in the rate of infant playful expressions. However, modalities of playful expression varied with type of play: in social play, the rate of play faces was high, whereas in solitary play, the rate of body expressions was high. Among the most frequent types of play, mild contact social play had the highest rates of play faces and multi-modal expressions (often play faces with hitting). Social partners matched both infant play faces and infant body expressions, but play faces were matched at a significantly higher rate that increased with age. Matched expression rates were highest when playing with peers despite infant expressiveness being highest when playing with older chimpanzees. Given that playful expressions emerge early in life and continue to occur in solitary contexts through the second year of life, we suggest that the play face and certain body behaviors are emotional expressions of joy, and that such expressions develop additional social functions through interactions with peers and older social partners. (shrink)

Henrich et al. convincingly caution against the overgeneralization of findings from particular human populations, but fail to apply their own compelling reasoning to our nearest living relatives, the great apes. Here we argue that rearing history is every bit as important for understanding cognition in other species as it is in humans.

Plato’s allegory of the cave tells of the soul’s advance from ignorance to knowledge, leaving open the question of what this knowledge is and what its objects are. Heidegger’s 1947 analysis of the allegory is of course just one of many. However, as I argue in this paper, if we read that analysis in the context of Husserlian phenomenology, we find a remarkable congruence between the latter’s process of “eidetic reduction” and the ascent out of the cave. In §1, I (...) lay out the phenomenological concepts relevant to my interpretation of Heidegger’s text. In §2, I apply these to the allegory itself. In §3, I examine Heidegger’s critique of eidetic “truth” in the allegory, arguing that it equally applies to Husserl’s phenomenology. My paper shows both the utility and limits of a “phenomenological” approach toreading Plato’s theory of forms. (shrink)

Heyes argues that nonhuman primates are unable to imitate, recognize themselves in mirrors, and take another's perspective, and that none of these capabilities are evidence for theory of mind. First, her evaluation of the evidence, especially for imitation and mirror self-recognition, is inaccurate. Second, she neglects to address the important developmental evidence that these capabilities are necessary precursors in the development of theory of mind.

The spatial organization of the genome is intimately linked to its biological function, yet our understanding of higher order genomic structure is coarse, fragmented and incomplete. In the nucleus of eukaryotic cells, interphase chromosomes occupy distinct.

In this book, field and laboratory researchers show that the Great Apes are capable of thinking at symbolic levels, traditionally considered uniquely human.

Food-specific inhibition training (FSIT) is a computerised task requiring response inhibition to energy-dense foods within a reaction-time game. Previous work indicates that FSIT can increase the number of healthy foods (relative to energy-dense foods) children choose, and decrease calories consumed from sweets and chocolate. Across two studies, we explored the impact of FSIT variations (e.g., different response signals, different delivery modes) on children’s food choices within a time-limited hypothetical food-choice task. In Study 1, we varied the FSIT Go/No-Go signals to (...) be emotive (happy vs. sad faces) or neutral (green vs. red signs). One-hundred-and-fifty-seven children were randomly allocated to emotive-FSIT, neutral-FSIT, or a non-food control task. Children participated in groups of 4–15. No significant FSIT effects were observed on food choices (all values ofp> 0.160). Healthy-food choices decreased over time regardless of condition (p 0.050). Healthy choices decreased over time in the control group (p= 0.001) but did not change in the two FSIT groups (bothp> 0.300) supporting previous evidence that FSIT may have a beneficial effect on children’s food choices. Ensuring that children perform FSIT with high accuracy (e.g., by using FSIT in quiet environments and avoiding group-testing) may be important for impacts on food choices though. Future research should continue to explore methods of optimising FSIT as a healthy-eating intervention for children. (shrink)

Many philosophers have challenged the ideal of value-free science on the grounds that social or moral values are relevant to inferential thresholds. But given this view, how precisely and to what extent should scientists adjust their inferential thresholds in light of nonepistemic values? We suggest that signal detection theory provides a useful framework for addressing this question. Moreover, this approach opens up further avenues for philosophical inquiry and has important implications for philosophical debates concerning inductive risk. For example, the signal (...) detection theory framework entails that considerations of inductive risk and inferential-threshold placement cannot be conducted in isolation from base-rate information. (shrink)

Some features of the concept of a want, and of the explaining relation in which a want may stand to an action, have not received sufficient attention. In what follows we shall offer some suggestions and descriptions which may be one step toward remedy of this situationi. We shall be at pains to point out the extent to which the features we describe fit in with a conception of the explanations of actions conforming to the inferential (deductive or inductive) and (...) nomological patterns of scientific explanation, and also to point out where perhaps the fit is not so snug. (shrink)

Previous scholars seem to assume that Mengzi’s 孟子 four sprouts are more or less homogeneous in nature, and the four sprouts are often viewed as some sort of desires for or instinctive inclinations toward virtues or virtuous acts. For example, Angus Graham interprets sìduān 四端 as “incipient moral impulses” to do what is morally good or right, or “spontaneous inclinations” toward virtues or moral good. However, this view is incompatible with the recently proposed more sound views that regard Mengzi’s four (...) sprouts as a particular type of emotions or feelings having some “cognitive” or “rational” aspects. In this essay I develop this new approach to Mengzi’s four sprouts, and specifically argue that respect in Mengzi should be considered neither as a moral desire nor as a behavioral tendency to do deferential acts but as some sort of ethical sensibility that is responsive to the relevant features of a worthy person. (shrink)

How does mind fit into nature? Philosophy has long been concerned with this question. No contemporary philosopher has done more to clarify it than Jaegwon Kim, a distinguished analytic philosopher specializing in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. With new contributions from an outstanding line-up of eminent scholars, this volume focuses on issues raised in Kim's work. The chapters cluster around two themes: first, exclusion, supervenience, and reduction, with attention to the causal exclusion argument for which Kim is widely celebrated; and (...) second, phenomenal consciousness and qualia, with attention to the prospects for a functionalist account of the mental. This volume is sure to become a major focus of attention and research in the disciplines of metaphysics and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

The Analects of Dasan, Volume II: A Korean Synthetic Reading, is an English translation of Noneo gogeum ju, with the translator's comments on the creative ideas and interpretations of Dasan on the Analects. It not only represents one of the greatest achievements of Korean Confucianism but also demonstrates innovative prospects for Confucian philosophy.

For the physicalist, the mind-body problem is the problem of finding a place for the mind in a world that is fundamentally physical. What does “fundamentally physical” mean? I think any physicalist will accept at least the following two claims. First, the world contains nothing but bits of matter and aggregates of bits of matter. There are no Cartesian souls, or Hegelian spirits, or neo-vitalist entelechies—as the emergentist C. Lloyd Morgan put it, no “alien influx” into the natural order. This (...) ontological thesis is sometimes called “ontological physicalism”. Second, we have the supervenience thesis: physical facts determine all the facts, and the physical properties of a thing determine all its properties. At this point, then, the world looks like this: all the things that exist are physical things—either basic bits of matter or wholly made up of bits of matter. These physical things have properties. What properties? First, there are basic physical properties, like mass, size, shape, electric charge, and so on—properties and magnitudes in terms of which laws of physics are formulated. But some properties of complex physical systems, like biological organisms, seem prima facie nonphysical—at least, they are not among the properties investigated in physics or the physical sciences. Prominent among them are mental properties—beliefs, desires, sensations, emotions, and the rest. The supervenience thesis says that such properties are fixed by the physical properties of the systems that have them; once the physical properties of a system are fixed, that fixes all of its properties. And yet property dualists, or nonreductive physicalists, maintain that although certain non-physical properties are determined by physical properties, they are irreducible to, and remain distinct from, physical properties. Although thoughts and pains are determined by the biology, and ultimately physicochemistry, of an organism, they are not biological/physical properties themselves, and there exists a special autonomous science of psychology, or cognitive science, that is responsible for investigating them. (shrink)

The present study used masked repetition priming to examine whether face representations can be accessed without attention. Two experiments using a face recognition task presented masked repetition and control primes in spatially unattended locations prior to target onset. Experiment 1 used the same images as primes and as targets and Experiment 2 used different images of the same individual as primes and targets. Repetition priming was observed across both experiments regardless of whether spatial attention was cued to the location of (...) the prime. Priming occurred for both famous and non-famous targets in Experiment 1 but was only reliable for famous targets in Experiment 2, suggesting that priming in Experiment 1 indexed access to view-specific representations whereas priming in Experiment 2 indexed access to view-invariant, abstract representations. Overall, the results indicate that subliminal access to abstract face representations does not rely on attention. (shrink)

Currently, there is a resurgence of interests in phenomenology in education. This article sheds light on the importance of hermeneutical phenomenology in teaching and learning based on the lived experience of a Sioux Indian adolescent boy, elicited from an ethnographic case study conducted at an alternative high school in the US. Employing narrative inquiry, this article seeks phenomenological ways of understanding students' lived experiences and explores the meaning of the pedagogical practice of hermeneutical phenomenology in education. I delve into how (...) hermeneutical understanding of the phenomena of students' lived experience can catapult both students and teachers into the personal growth and development in a reciprocal way. It is my hope that such an understanding will facilitate an educational aim that focuses on the ontology of being and becoming while students' existence is brought to the center of teaching and learning. (shrink)

Scholars are becoming increasingly interested in whether and how government use of Big Data will affect public policy outcomes. Despite such growing scholarly interests, however, little evidence exists on the role Big Data can play in improving government service. We undertake one of the first quantitative studies revealing the potential utility and limitations of “Big Data-based policymaking” by exploring its recent use by the Seoul Metropolitan Government. In 2013, the government introduced the “Owl Bus”—a late-night bus system—the routes of which (...) were selected based on government analyses of Big Data relating to citizens’ late-night taxi and mobile phone use. The findings suggest that the average number of passengers utilizing the Owl Bus routes was significantly greater than that on other daytime bus routes with comparable characteristics. That said, we also present the potential limitations of evidence-based policymaking in general, especially when politics and equity considerations are factored in. (shrink)

Self-interest is widely accepted as a powerful motivator by both academics and laypeople alike. However, research surrounding the self-interest motive paints a complicated picture of this most important psychological construct. Additionally, research on the social desirability of self-interest has revealed that despite its widespread acceptance, people do not readily accept that self-interest drives their own behaviors. This paper reviews the literature on self-interest and reveals several curious features surrounding its actual effect on helping behaviors, political attitudes and voting, and people's (...) apparent ambivalence toward self-interest as a motive. It is possible that norms against the expression of self-interestedness evolved, creating ambivalence towards this widely accepted construct, subsequently affecting its expression on many human behaviors. (shrink)